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Pacific Island Economies: Some Observations on the Economic 
Consequences of Natural Disasters 
The many difficult development problems faced by small resource-poor island countries 
such as those in the South Pacific, are all too familiar. Certainly, with small Pacific island 
countries the leading constraint is vulnerability to external shocks that can lead to 
economic collapse. Collapsibility can arise either from a sudden loss of export markets or 
a sharp decline in the terms of trade, and can lead to a drastic decline in GDP and export 
earnings and prolonged economic stagnation. Other major disturbances can arise from a 
political crisis ( e.g., Fiji 1987); the exhaustion of a major non-renewable export product 
(e.g., Kiribati 1979); crop destruction by insects or viral disease (e.g., Western Samoa 
1993). As well, economic collapse can arise from periodic natural disasters such as 
cyclones and prolonged drought. 
Valuable insights into the economic collapsibility of small island countries in the Pacific 
can be found in recent works by Tisdell (1985), Kakazu (1985) and Fairbairn (1987). By 
means of simple growth models, these authors show that stnall island countries are 
incapable of sustainable growth because of vulnerability to external shocks, particularly a 
collapse in export demand combined with population growth. The analyses come out in 
favour of development policies that, among other things, encourage subsistence production 
as a sheet -anchor for these economies. 
The aim of this paper is to address another potential source of economic collapsibility -
natural hazards particularly in the form of highly destructive tropical cyclones. The paper 
focuses on the recent incidence of tropical cyclones in the South Pacific, the severity of 
the devastation to these economies, and the impact on growth and policy responses. 
Particular attention is given to the consequences of a recent cyclone in Western Samoa 
and a simple theoretical model is presented showing the effects of cyclone devastation. 
The paper is essentially an exploratory study aimed at highlighting some of the major 
economic costs to small resource-poor island economies. 
Natural disasters in the South Pacific: general observations 
By virtue of geography and climatic characteristics, the South Pacific is susceptible to 
periodic and highly destructive tropical cyclones. While data are inadequate, the available 
evidence shows that particular zones and countries are especially vulnerable. This appears 
to be true of the oceanic zones around Guam and the Northern Marianas in the Northern 
Pacific and those around Tonga, Western Samoa and Vanuatu in the south. Data compiled 
by the World Bank (1991, p. 21) show that among its Pacific member countries, during 
the 1980s, Fiji experienced at least five major cyclones, Vanuatu three, and Western 
Samoa three. 
The cyclones reported by the World Bank refer to those that have been most destructive 
for economic infrastructure, social and economic facilities and natural resources. Among 
the most damaging of the recent cyclones were those experienced by Solomon Islands, 
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Vanuatu and Western Samoa. Thus in Solomon Islands, the 1986 cyclone killed 101 
persons, rendered 60,000 persons homeless and wrought heavy damage to crops and 
infrastructure. This cyclone had particularly destructive effects on a number of small 
outer islands including Makirna, Rennell and Bellona. In the case of Vanuatu, a cyclone 
in 1987 caused heavy damage to crops and utilities both in the main island (Efate) and 
several outer islands. A total of 48 persons were killed while the overall damage to those 
affected came to an estimated US$2 million'. 
Western Samoa has been devastated by two major cyclones over the 1990-91 period. The 
second of these - Cyclone Val - stuck in December 1991 and is described in detail in the 
next section. The first - Cyclone Ofa - was experienced in 1990 and killed 11 persons, 
affected 80,000 and left total damage estimated at US$140 million. Destruction was 
widespread and severe damage was inflicted on housing, infrastructure (especially port 
and roads) and agriculture. Productive capacity suffered heavily with and estimated 70 
per cent loss of crops and 50 per cent of livestock. 
The nature and extent of the damage caused by periodic cyclones to small Pacific island 
countries deserves close and systematic analysis. However, with reference to the recent 
experience of Fiji, Western Samoa and Vanuatu, the evidence indicates that, leaving out 
loss of life, the major areas of damage are: 
o agriculture, both commercial (including exports) and subsistence, with tree crops 
suffering the greatest damage 
o inshore fisheries, arising from storm damage to coral and lagoonal habitats 
o infrastructure, particularly power, port and road facilities 
o social facilities including housing and schools 
o natural resources, including indigenous and exotic forests and coastal zones 
Regarding agriculture, the damage can be especially severe, and it is not uncommon for 
almost total destruction of such crops as bananas, breadfruit and coconuts. 
The consequences - both direct and indirect - of cyclone devastation on these small 
economics can be both traumatic and prolonged. The overnight destruction of crops and 
inshore fisheries results in an immediate shortage of domestically produced foodstuff. It 
also results in the collapse of the export sector which is heavily dominated by primary 
products such as copra, taro and coconut oil. If domestic consumption levels are to be 
maintained, the local food supply will have to be supplemented by imports and donations 
from overseas agencies and voluntary groups. Industrial production as well as service 
industries will also decline as a result of both direct damage to premises and disruption to 
power, transport and telecommunications. The end result is a dramatic fall in productive 
One US dollar exchanged for 2.30 Western Samoan tala in (end) 1989; 2.44 tala in 1990; 2.40 
tala in 1992 and 2.60 tala in 1993 (Central Bank 1994 p.54). 
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capacity and, in tum, GDP. A consequential fall in real GDP of up to 10 per cent can 
occur. 
Cyclone devastation will also have far reaching macroeconomic implications. A major 
adjustment to macroeconomic policy will be called for in the light of economic collapse 
and human welfare considerations. Key areas that need to be addressed include the 
deterioration in the balance of payments that will inevitably follow from reduced exports 
and increased import demands and the consequent drain on foreign reserves. Significant 
changes will also be called for in fiscal and monetary policy in order to acconunodate 
emergency needs and rehabilitation. The sudden pressure on public funds will inevitably 
result in deficit spending (or enlargement of existing deficits) in the recurrent budget and 
acconunodating borrowing activity. Monetary policy will have to be eased to provide 
personal and business credit for rehabilitation purposes. The shortage of locally produced 
foods combined with government spending and credit expansion will inevitably create 
inflationary pressure - a trend that will need to be carefully monitored. 
From recent regional experience, the official response to cyclone devastation has embraced 
emergency and rehabilitation efforts at the national, regional and international levels. 
Nationally, governments have launched major programs aimed at economic rehabilitation 
and rebuilding. This has usually involved a significant diversion of budgetary resources 
away from budgeted capital works to inunediate rehabilitation of infrastructure and the 
productive base. This invariably calls for aid donors to revise their aid priorities to 
acconunodate rehabilitation needs. It has also involved institutional changes, usually the 
establishment of an emergency body responsible for assessing the damage and for advising 
on the distribution of emergency assistance. 
International agencies and countries have usually provided considerable support and 
assistance. Apart from emergency relief, these have provided technical assistance and 
fmancial assistance to carry out rehabilitation work As well, valuable assistance -
usually in the form of food, shelter and materials - are given by overseas voluntary 
groups, while assistance in the form of remittances from overseas kinsmen is another 
important source of support. 
The impact of natural disasters, especially tropical cyclones, on economic growth in small 
Pacific island countries needs to be analysed in detail. All in all, the actual performance 
of many of these countries has been disappointing, with growth in real GDP no more than 
around one per cent per armurn - well below population growth. However, these can be 
no doubt that much of the recent weaknesses (and volatility) experienced by these 
countries can be attributed to the effects of periodic cyclone devastation (World Bank 
1991, p.20). 
Cyclone damage in Western Samoa, 1991 
As mentioned above, Western Samoa has been devastated by cyclones twice over the past 
few years - Cyclone Ofa in 1990 and Cyclone Val in 1991. Cyclone Val, striking over a 
four day period (6th - 9th December) was said to be the most destructive in over 100 
years with winds reaching speeds of over 150 miles per hour. The effects on natural 
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resources, agriculture, infrastructure, housing, health and education facilities were 
catastrophic. The damage caused to the economy and suppcrting infrastructure greatly 
affected growth prospects especially following so soon after Cyclone Ofa and caused a 
significant degree of macroeconomic instability. 
Damage to agriculture and infrastructure was particularly severe. In relation to agriculture, 
the damage to basic subsistence crops, notably bananas, breadfruit and root crops, was 
almost total (damage was estimated at over US$20 million). Similarly, damage to tree 
crops including coconuts - an export staple - was estimated at between 90 and 100 per 
cent and equal to US$14 million}'. In the case of economic and social infrastructure, the 
destruction to buildings, ports, roads, water supply and power were the most severe. 
The total cyclone bill was estimated at a huge US$300 million - or US$1,900 per capita -
equal to three times GDP. The total cost by major sectors is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Cyclone Val Damage Cost Estimates; Sectoral Summary, 1992. 
Sector Estimated 
cost (WSSm) 
Roads 31 
Major bridges 3 
Water supply 5 
Apia surface drainage project minor 
Coastal protection works 6 
Buildings and dwellings 330 
airports 3 
Ports 18 
Sea transport 1 
Power supply 11 
Postal and telecommunications 4 
Primary industry (agriculture) 201 
Education 13 
Health 20 
Fire services 2 
Environment, parks and reserves 65 
Total 713 
Source: Final Damage AssessD)ent Report, National Disaster Council, Gov=ent of Western Samoa, 1992, 
p.33. 
Note: In 1992, when these estimates were compiled, one Western Samoan tala was worth approximately 
US$0.41. 
2 These estimates were made by the National Disaster Committee formed to assess the fmal 
damage arising from the cyclone and to provide guidelines on the distribution of emergency 
relief. 
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In these estimates, damage to agriculture refers to the value of lost production and 
infrastructure and housing by replacement cost. 
Recent data on GDP are not available, unfortunately, because these would allow cyclone 
damage to be measured more precisely both nationally and on a sector basis. Estimates 
made soon after the cyclone indicated that, as a result of cyclone devastation, GDP in 
1992 would decline by four to six per cent (ADB 1992, p.2). GDP would also record 
negative growth in 1993, but at a more modest rate as economic recovery began to 
become apparent. Such an outcome represents a major setback to the national economy 
which had been recovering well after the onslaught of Cyclone Ofa. 
Cyclone damage caused a more dramatic collapse in the country's export base, dominated 
by coconut and related products. This is reflected in total export earnings which declined 
from a level of around US$14 million in 1989 -a fairly normal year- to US$6 million in 
1992 - a decline of nearly 60 per cent. Regarding the leading exports, coconut oil fell 
from a level of US$2 million in 1989 to nil (in 1992); cocoa from US$0.5 million to nil; 
copra from US$1.5 million to nil; and taro from US$2.8 million to US$2.1 million. In the 
case of taro, part of the decline was dues to a diversion of supply to the domestic market. 
Export earnings for another major export - coconut cream - had to rely on imported raw 
materials to sustain export production. The overall decline in the export of these products 
(other than coconut cream) fell from US$7.0 million in 1989 to US$2.4 million in 1992 -
a 65 per cent decline. 
Overall, the balance of payments suffered severely during the 1989-92 period, as reflected 
in a change in net foreign assets from a positive US$15 million to a negative US$9 
million. Underlying this change is the decline in export earnings noted above and a 
substantial rise in imports from US$80 million (cif) in 1989 to US$130 million in 1992. 
Although there was a notable increase in the level of net private transfers (dominated by 
private remittance flows), the considerable imbalance in merchandise trade resulted in a 
substantial rise in the current account deficit - from a negative US$1.6 million to a 
negative US$50 million. A significant increase in proceeds from official loans in the 
capital account helped to offset the large current account deficit but this still left a major 
part of the current account deficit to be fmanced from external reserves. 
The impact on domestic consumer prices was quickly felt. A month after Cyclone Val, 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) surged by six per cent which predominantly reflected the 
sudden shortage of locally produced foodstuffs. By mid-year, the annual rate of inflation 
had climbed to 12 per cent which compares with virtually zero inflation during 1991 (as 
compared with a period of high inflation in 1990 caused by Cyclone Ofa). It might be 
noted that inflation has since moderated and, as at end 1993, was recorded at just over 
four per cent per annum. 
Government's fiscal and capital works programs underwent drastic revision in response to 
emergency and rehabilitation needs of the economy. While the government remained 
committed to a policy of fiscal prudence, the need for economic rehabilitation led to 
significant diversion of budgetary resources away from planned development programs to 
rehabilitation activities. This inevitably led to a widening of the deficit on current account 
and substantially increased reliance on external development fmance, especially from 
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international agencies such as the World Bank. 
Reflecting the emphasis on rehabilitation, government's recurrent expenditure rose from a 
level of US$32 million in 1990 to US$46 million in 1991 - a 43 per cent increase -
(compared with a 17 per cent increase in current revenues). At the same time, 
development expenditure increased by a more modest 20 per cent. Over the wider period 
- 1989 to 1992/93 - recurrent revenue expanded by 40 per cent but recurrent expenditure 
and development expenditure expanded by a corresponding 80 per cent and 160 per cent 
respectively. The resulting resource gap relied heavily on external savings, particularly in 
the form of concessionary loans. 
Fiscal response was accompanied by an easing of monetary policy and related 
macroeconomic measures. A notable initiative was the introduction, by the central bank, 
of a temporary Emergency Credit Arrangement facility under which the commercial banks 
were granted approval to provide special loans needed for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. Within several months, total loans granted under this scheme reached 
nearly US$3.0 million. Another major concession was a decision to considerably reduce 
the rate of import duty charged on building materials in support of residential and 
commercial building reconstruction work. Both these measures were aimed at providing 
temporary relief but it was inevitable that they would contribute to macroeconomic 
instability in the inunediate term. 
A number of regional and international organisations played a particularly key role in 
Western Samoa's rehabilitation effort. Technical assistance, for example by AIDAB, ADS 
and the World Bank, was provided to assess cyclone damage at national and sector levels 
and to identify priority rehabilitation needs (Government of Western Samoa 1992(a)). 
Donors pledged fmancial support (chiefly concessionary loans) for urgent rehabilitation 
work, including repair work on roads, port and power facilities and commitments were 
undertaken in accordance with rehabilitation needs. 
Western Samoa's recent experience of cyclone devastation points to a number of 'lessons' 
that need to be heeded and acted upon if its capacity to cope with such natural diasters is 
to improve (Government of Western Samoa 1992(b) p.34). Among key measures that 
need to be addressed are the installation of a reliable early cyclone warning system; the 
adoption of an appropriate building code to ensure quality and durability; and the 
institution of a public education system on disaster preparedness. Agricultural patterns 
and techniques capable of minimising crop damage also need to be considered. An 
appropriate national body should also be established responsible for ongoing disaster 
preparedness work, and to coordinate relief and related disaster mitigation efforts. 
Cyclone damage: a formal analysis 
It will be apparent from what has been said above that, for small resource-poor island 
economies susceptible to natural disasters, the economic costs of cyclone devastation can 
be enormous. The damage to the productive base of these economies can be substantial, 
particularly through heavy destruction of crops, inshore fisheries, forests and a range of 
basic infrastructure facilities. Economic collapse can be significant while cyclone damage 
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can virtually wipe out much of an economy's export base. Although certain areas of 
agriculture can recover quickly, the rebuilding of the capital base of the economy will take 
time, and this will tend to impede the process of economic recovery. The loss of 
production can result in a significant decline in community welfare. 
It may be useful to show the economic consequences of cyclone devastation on small 
island economies by means of a simple production model such as shown in Fig 1. Such a 
model shows how a small economy can collapse from severe cyclone damage to 
(potential) production (e.g., crops) and the capital base (e.g., power) of the economy. To 
facilitate the analysis the model relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Thus, it is 
assumed that the island economy comprises two sectors - a monetary sector producing a 
single commercial crop and a non-monetary component producing a single subsistence 
product. The production function for the commercial product is assumed to be a 
conventional one, such as represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function, where 
output is a function of factor inputs. In the case of the subsistence good, production is 
assumed to be a function only of labour input. Further assumptions are that population 
(and the labour supply, N) remain unchanged and teclmical change is absent. 
In Fig 1, the aggregate production function is represented by the curve EFG which shows 
rising levels of output (but at a diminishing rate) with increasing capital input (assuming 
constant labour input, N, and no teclmical change). Tills production function is derived by 
superimposing the production function applying to the monetary sector to that for the non-
monetary economy (shown by the line EE - which is perfectly inelastic to a change in 
capital stock). Assuming an initial capital stock of K1 on the K axis, and given the 
aggregate production function (EFG), the resulting level of output (or income) is shown by 
Y 1 on the vertical axis. Y 1 represents total income that K1 is capable of producing, and 
results in a level of per capita income equal to Y 1 fN 
Suppose now that the economy is devastated by a tropical cyclone as damaging as those 
that have recently struck Western Samoa and other small Pacific island countries. This 
will result in economic collapse for (conceptually) two main reasons, namely loss of 
output potential on the one hand and destruction or damage to capital stock on the other. 
The loss of output takes place in both the monetary and non-monetary sectors, with the 
overall loss represented by a downward shift of the aggregate production function shown 
by curve ABCD. As may be seen from Fig. 1, other than at the origin, the extent of the 
collapse of the aggregate production function (as measured by the vertical distance 
between the two production functions) is greater than the distance between points E and A 
on the vertical axis representing the extent of the collapse in subsistence production. Set 
against the initial capital stock, K~o the new production function would result in reduced 
output, equal to Y 2• Tills would also result in lower levels of output per capita 
(Y,/N<Y1/N). 
Economic collapse also encompasses the effects of reduced capital stock due to the 
destruction of capital both natural and man-made - a factor that (by definition) affects only 
productive activity in the monetary sector of the economy. Thus if is assumed that capital 
stock is reduced to say, K2 in the K axis, then, given the (collapsed) curve ABCD, the 
new level of potential output is given by Y 3 in the vertical axis. As can be seen from the 
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figure, the combined effects of a loss of output and reduced capital stock (OK1 - OK2), 
results in a significant collapse in the economy, specifically from point F to point B, and a 
decline in output equal to Y 1 - Y 3_ At point 8, the level of per capita income is 
significantly less than had prevailed at the pre-cyclone level of output - that is to say, 
YJN<Y1[N by a considerable margin. The loss of per capita income is equal to 
Y1 /N -YJN. 
Figure 1: Economic Collapse due to Cyclone Devastation 
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An important aspect of the above model is that the movement from point F to point B is 
instantaneous. Economic collapse can take place virtually overnight, depending on the 
duration (and movement) of a particular cyclone. This, in turn, will have a traumatic 
effect on the local population, and involve a significant welfare loss. 
It is possible for a devastated economy to languish at the lower level of income - point B 
- for an extended period of time. While several crops (e.g., taro, bananas and breadfruit) 
can regenerate quickly, this is not true of other agricultural staples, notably coconut and 
cocoa which are basic export crops that take several years (as many as five) to recover. 
Reflecting a heavy dependence on agriculture, export activity will be slow to recover. As 
well, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and overall capital base is likely to be· a slow 
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process, especially in the absence of significant external technical and financial assistance. 
A critical constraint is the lack of a domestic savings base to support the rehabilitation of 
the capital stock. In light of such possible constraints, the process of economic recovery 
(from point B to point F in Fig.l) and with it the restoration of per capita income can be a 
long drawn out process with a heavy cost in terms of output foregone. 
The economic plight of these countries can be significantly aggravated by population 
growth. Allowing for population growth, economic collapse will be even more traumatic 
and economic recovery much harder to attain. It means that, even if the pre-cyclone level 
of output is reached (i.e. Y1), income per capita will be lower than before, and may take a 
significant rise in output above Y1 (depending on the rate of growth of population) for 
income per capita to exceed that originally associated with Y1 • 
Previous models on the collapsibility of small resource-poor island countries, for example 
those of Kakazu (1985) and Tisdell (1985) show that deleterious effects on the economy 
( ·1 of a loss of an export market or the depletion of a major non-renewable resource is 
· ·· / permanent. By contrast, the damage to the economy through natural disasters is a 
temporary phenomenon. In time, the economy can recover to pre-cyclone levels through 
the natural regeneration of crops and rebuilding of capital stock and support infrastructure. 
In practice, there are factors ensuring that these small Pacific island countries have been 
able to recover reasonably well from cyclone damage to the economy. A critical factor 
has been firm government commitment to economic rehabilitation and restoration as 
recently illustrated by the case of Western Samoa. A major factor has been the 
willingness to reorder government spending priorities in favour of economic rehabilitation. 
Another critical factor has been a substantial aid response to cyclone devastation in the 
form of technical assistance, fmance, food and related items. Generous donor support has 
been particularly instrumental in the rebuilding of the capital base, and hence productive 
capacity. Other favourable factors have been a substantial upsurge in construction activity 
- commercial, infrastructural and residential - associated with cyclone reconstruction in 
some considerable measure underpinned by aid-supported projects. The relatively quick 
recovery of a number of food crops, as noted above, also contributes to overall recovery 
(including the restoration of price stability). 
Economic recovery will therefore depend greatly on both domestic measures and the 
international response. Where government policy and international assistance have been 
responsive and well directed (and in the absence of other external shocks), the process of 
economic recovery can take place relatively quickly. The regional experience suggests 
that, under reasonably favourable conditions (with favourable aid-support particularly 
critical), the economy can return to pre-cyclone levels of income within a period of five to 
six years. This implies a restoration of the capital stock and output potential (but not 
necessarily income per capita if population has grown in the intervening period). 
An illustrative time path for economic recovery is given in Fig. 2, showing an economic 
recovery over a four to six year period following economic collapse at point C. It is 
assumed that the economy collapses from a base year (real GDP for that year equals 100) 
by around five per cent, that is, from point C to D in Fig. 2. The economy will linger at 
the collapsed level of income, D, for some time and may even decline further as the after 
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effects of cyclone damage continue to be felt. The component DEF of the overall income 
curve, BCDEF, represents a hypothetical economic recovery scenario under favourable 
conditions, notably an adequate external aid response (here, year-to-year fluctuations in 
income levels are ignored.) As may be noted, the pace of recovery accelerates somewhat 
around years two and three as crop regeneration and capital rehabilitation take effect. By 
year five, the economy is back at the pre-cyclone level of income and, in the absence of 
further natural disasters, will then continue to grow. 
However, without adequate external assistance, the recovery process will take a lot longer. 
The latter scenario is depicted by the broken segment DEG, which, in this hypothetical 
situation, shows a 10-year recovery period. This recovery scenario largely reflects the 
slow rebuilding of capital stock and infrastructure and point to the vital role played by 
external assistance in the overall rehabilitation process. 
Figure 2: Possible Economic Recovery Scenario 
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Many small island countries of the South Pacific are susceptible to periodic devastation by 
natural disasters, notably tropical cyclones. Economic collapse can occur as a result of 
cyclone devastation, particularly through the heavy destruction of crops, capital stock and 
support infrastructure. Damage to the economy, both monetary and subsistence sectors, 
can result in severe loss of production, much reduced levels of per capita income (and 
welfare) and a degree of macroeconomic instability. Recovery can be slow but much will 
depend on domestic policy stance and the commitment to economic rehabilitation and the 
response of the international aid community. A major challenge is to attempt to gain a 
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clearer understanding of the economic consequences of cyclone devastation in these small 
island countries, and to develop appropriate policy and institutional mechanisms -
including international support programs - for coping with and mitigating the destructive 
effects of natural disasters. 
Dr. Te'o I. J. Fairbairn 
Charlestown 
June, 1994 
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